Three to four months after completing their Michigan prison sentences in
1994, Willie Thomas, Jr., Larry Reed, and Edward Grant were picked up and
imprisoned in Jackson prison without a hearing. The defendant prison
officials believed they had miscalculated the time served by each of the men.

Once at Jackson, ...

WI DOC Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Holding Prisoner Past His
Release Date

James Allen, a Wisconsin state prisoner, was held 377 days beyond his
mandatory release date because he didn't have a Department of Corrections
(DOC) approved address. He was released on a writ of habeas corpus. He then
sued DOC officials in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming several
civil rights violations. The DOC didn't dispute violating Allen's rights
but thought it was entitled to qualified immunity. The trial court ruled
otherwise, and the DOC appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in Wisconsin found that the law was
sufficiently clear to put the DOC on notice that if it held Allen past his
release date it would violate his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court,
therefore, affirmed the trial court's denial of qualified immunity to the
DOC. See: Allen v. Guerrero, 276 Wis. 2d 679, 688 N.W. 2d 673 (2004).

The plaintiff obtained an order stating that he should be released from the
Taos County Adult Detention Center; however, by then he was at the
Bernalillo County Detention Center. Officials at the latter were entitled
to qualified immunity for not releasing him. The defendants were not
obligated by Constitution or statute to investigate to find out if that
order required his release from the second facility; "mere jailers" have
only a duty to determine the facial validity of a warrant. See: Scull v.
New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588 (10th Cir. 2000).

The defendants created a training exercise intended to prepare jailers for
a hostage situation, and did entirely too good a job of it, according to
the plaintiff jailers. They enlisted two probationary jailers to play
inmates. They were allowed into the jail even though they were carrying
fake metal guns. They entered the control room and put some staff members
up against the wall, shouted obscenities, pushed other staff members to the
floor, threatened their lives, kicked them, etc., and announced over the
intercom that they had taken over the second floor. Other staff panicked.

The defendants' actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
since the plaintiffs' freedom of movement was terminated from the viewpoint
of a reasonable person. The probation officers' disguise as inmates did
not keep them from being state actors.

The plaintiffs stated a claim under Bell v. Wolfish. The government has a
legitimate interest in preparing its staff for a crisis. However, a
reasonable jury could find that the seizure was excruciatingly long and
subjected the plaintiffs both to intense fear of bodily harm or death and
to the actual possibility that such might occur (apparently because
prisoners might have taken advantage of the situation, ...

After filing suit in August 1997, a juvenile female prisoner who suffered
emotional distress and facial bruising while being forcibly restrained by
personnel at the Marygrove Residential Treatment Facility settled her claim
for $1,000.

The girl had alleged in her suit, filed in St. Louis County, that the
defendants subjected ...

Jail Official Gets Immunity for Delaying Prisoner's Release for One Day

A county prison official was entitled to qualified immunity for delaying the plaintiff's release for a day based on an alleged warrant from Massachusetts that she had not actually seen; her actions probably didn't violate the Constitution, and it certainly wasn't clearly established that it is unconstitutional to detain a prisoner for one day based on a telephone call from law enforcement. See: Wilson v. Zellner, 200 F.Supp.2d 1356 (M.D.Fla. 2002).

The plaintiff prison nurse alleged that, while suffering from a severe bout
of poison ivy and trying to leave for medical treatment, she was "held
hostage" by her supervisor and prevented from leaving the premises.

The supervisor, by instructing an officer not to open the door and by
standing in front of the door, engaged in a seizure of the plaintiff which
was not shown to be reasonable on this summary judgment record. These
facts also support a claim for false imprisonment. See: Barstow v. Shea,
196 F.Supp.2d 141 (D.Conn. 2002).

The plaintiff alleged that he was arrested without probable cause and
subjected to excessive force by the police. He was held for 12 days,
despite his protestations that the warrant on which he was held was for his
twin brother. After he was released, an internal affairs investigation
found the City's policies and procedures had been fully complied with. A
jury exonerated the individual officers but found liability based on a
police department policy, custom, or practice.

The City is free from liability for excessive force as a matter of law
because the officers were exonerated. However, it was properly held liable
for the claims for arrest without probable cause and deprivation of liberty
without due process, since "[t]hese constitutional deprivations were not
suffered as a result of actions of the individual officers, but as a result
of the collective inaction of the Long Beach Police Department." (917)
Id.: "If a plaintiff establishes he suffered a constitutional injury by
the City, the fact that individual officers are exonerated is immaterial to
liability under § 1983." Id. at n.4: "This is true whether the officers
are exonerated on the basis of qualified immunity, because they were merely
negligent, or for other ...

The plaintiffs (196 of them) sought to represent a class of persons
arrested without prior probable cause determinations challenging failure to
provide timely probable cause hearings.

The Supreme Court has said that generally, probable cause hearings should
occur within 48 hours of arrest, but more delay is not necessarily
unconstitutional and less delay may be unconstitutional. The passage of 48
hours shifts the burden to the defendants to justify the necessity of the
detention.

At 183: "When in doubt, a court should err in favor of the maintenance of a
class action." Accord, Rankin v. Rots, 220 F.R.D. 511, 517 (E.D.Mich.
2004). However, this court is troubled by the phrase "prompt probable
cause determination" in the class definition because it is not subject to
objective determination. The plaintiffs also propose seven subclasses,
which "tends to indicate a lack of commonality in the class as a whole. . .
. Although the court has the power to redefine classes or subclasses sua
sponte prior to certification, . . . the court has no obligation to do so,
. . ." and it doesn't, since it doesn't think granting certification would
make the case less unmanageable, and Rule 23 requirements are not ...

The plaintiff complained that he was detained for six months beyond his
maximum release date. His Eighth Amendment claim fails because he does not
show deliberate indifference; the defendant in the prison got to work on
the problem when he was notified about it, and the defendant clerk of court
had no personal involvement in computing time. The fact that the latter
didn't respond to the plaintiff's letter does not establish deliberate
indifference because others (including the other defendant) were available
to address the problem. Due process requires "meaningful and expeditious
consideration of claims that the term of prisoner's [sic] sentence has been
miscalculated" (539); that happened here. See: Royal v. Durison, 319
F.Supp.2d 534 (E.D.Pa. 2004).