The plaintiff alleged that he was held 65 days beyond his release date as a
result of a miscalculation, despite his advising the defendants of their
mistake and requesting that they correct it.

At 720:
Incarcerating a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence without
penological justification violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment when it is the product of deliberate
indifference. . . . To establish § 1983 liability for incarceration
without penological justification, a plaintiff must establish three
elements. . . . First, he must show that a prison official knew of his
problem and thus of the risk that he was being or would be subjected to
unwarranted punishment. Second, the plaintiff must show either that the
official failed to act or took action that was ineffectual under the
circumstances, thereby indicating that he was deliberately indifferent to
the plaintiff's plight. Finally, the plaintiff must show a causal
connection between the official's conduct and the unjustified detention.
Id. at n.1: The Fifth Circuit has addressed this problem under the
Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment, but it doesn't matter
because the analysis is essentially the same.

The plaintiff also asserted a procedural due ...

The plaintiffs alleged that they were kept past their release dates by the
D.C. Department of Correction; a subclass alleged that they were subjected
to strip searches upon return to jail after judicial determinations that
there was no basis for their detention except to be processed for release.

The court certifies the class. At 32: "Generally speaking, courts have
found that a proposed class consisting of at least forty members will
satisfy the impracticability requirement." The general rule is that
plaintiffs need not provide the exact number of potential class members.

A single common issue meets the commonality requirement. Common questions
include whether the defendant follows the practice of holding persons in
its custody later than their scheduled release date, and whether this
alleged practice violates the Constitution.

A claim meets the typicality requirement if it arises from the same event
or practice or course of conduct as other class members' claims and is
based on the same legal theory. Factual variations do not negate
typicality. Here, varying lengths of excessive confinement (from one to
210 days) do not defeat typicality.

Varying lengths of excessive detention do not establish a conflict of
interest; defendants speculated that those with short periods ...

The plaintiff was denied credit for time served through a record-keeping
error arising from the existence of two indictments for the same criminal
act. A county policy allegedly prohibited staff from counting days for the
same charge under two different court case numbers for jail time credit.

Municipal liability may be established either by showing a policy of
omission, which requires a showing of deliberate difference under Canton,
or by showing that an affirmative policy caused the violation, which does
not require proof of deliberate indifference. The plaintiff's claim is of
the second type so no deliberate indifference showing is necessary for his
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. However, his Eighth Amendment
claim requires a showing of deliberate indifference under the actual
knowledge standard of Farmer v. Brennan, since that is part of the
substantive cause of action. The evidence does not support that claim,
since there was only one prior incident of similar nature in the preceding
10 years, and no county employee knew that the plaintiff's two cases
involved the same incident early enough to do anything about it.

The plaintiff had "a well-settled Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
credit for time served in County custody," but there ...

The law is clearly established that a pre-trial detainee cannot be held for
12 days before being brought before a judge or allowed to pay bail. This
is another case where the plaintiff was picked up on a warrant, there was
no mechanism to ensure that he was taken to court or given the opportunity
to pay or know how much he had to pay, and nobody took any responsibility
for the situation, except for the sergeant to tried three times to contact
the City of Midville on the plaintiff's behalf but could never get anything
but a recording. The court analyzes the question as one of a liberty
interest created by state statutes governing court appearance and
bail-setting. See: Bunyon v. Burke County, 285 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D.Ga. 2003).

Second Circuit Discusses Damages for Loss of Liberty, Mental and Emotional
Injury

The plaintiff was involuntarily detained and hospitalized. He prevailed
both on his Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful seizure and his state law
claims for false imprisonment.

For damages purposes, the court treats mental and emotional injury as a
completely separate category of injury from loss of liberty, stating: "The
damages recoverable for loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful
confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as
physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional suffering; even absent such
other injuries, an award of several thousand dollars may be appropriate
simply for several hours' loss of liberty." (125) The court relies on an
earlier case in which it had held that, although juries are properly
instructed not to award "speculative damages," the trial court "should have
made it clear to the jury that it could award monetary damages the amount
necessarily arbitrary and unprovable for the intangibles which we have
referred to above." Id., quoting Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027
(1986). The court also relies extensively on tort cases ...

The defendants failed to credit the plaintiff properly for good time, even
though they had obtained a decision in prior litigation with him stating
the correct way of calculating it. As a result he spent six extra months
in prison.

The parties argue the case in terms of preclusion, but the court says that
the real question is whether the decision of the state court prescribing
how good time is to be calculated created a liberty interest in the
plaintiff's release date as determined thereby. It does. At 155: "Any
continued detention after the state has lost its lawful authority to hold a
prisoner deprives him of a liberty interest in freedom from restraint that
is protected from unlawful state deprivation by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." The federal court's job is not to reexamine the
state court's determination of state law (that would violate the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine!) but to determine whether the defendants correctly
applied the state court order. The defendants' claim that they did not
obey the state court's order because they thought it was wrong (even though
the state court adopted the position they put forward in the litigation)
does not impress the court. ...

The plaintiff sued to obtain the release of biological evidence for DNA
testing, alleging it would be exculpatory as to his criminal conviction.
His suit was, in effect, a challenge to the validity of his criminal
conviction that must be pursued via habeas corpus. Since he had already
lost a habeas proceeding on the subject, this action was properly dismissed
as a successive habeas petition. (That is an interesting application of
Heck and Preiser. The Heck rule bars federal suits in which success would
"necessarily imply" the invalidity of the state judgment on which
confinement is based. However, suits which do not directly challenge the
basis of confinement, but seek relief that would lead to another proceeding
which might or might not affect the basis of confinement, are generally not
barred. See, e.g., Dotson v. Wilkinson, 300 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a challenge to denial of parole eligibility, which if
successful would entitle the prisoner only to a parole hearing that could
go either way, is not barred by Heck). The court in this case does not
explain why the existence of a further contingency between success in
obtaining evidence for DNA testing and the ultimate invalidation ...

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's dismissal of
a suit against several parole officials, finding they were not entitled to
absolute immunity.

In 1990, Lance Dawson was convicted of Indiana criminal charges and placed
on probation for 3 years, with a suspended 6 year sentence. In 1992,
Dawson's probation officer filed a notice of probation violation, but a
hearing was never held.

On June 12, 2000, approximately ten years after being placed on probation
and eight years after the alleged violation, the State filed an amended
notice of probation violation. On October 23, 2000, Judge Newman revoked
Dawson's probation and imposed the six-year term of incarceration.

On July 18, 2001, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Dawson's
probation revocation was improper as it occurred long after his term of
probation had expired. See: Dawson v. State, 751 NE.2d 812, 815 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001). On remand, Judge Newman ordered Dawson's immediate release.
The judge's office faxed a copy of the appellate decision to the Indiana
Department of Corrections (DOC), but failed to send the release order.

As the wheels of Dawson's imminent release ostensibly were moving
forward, he remained in custody for another fourteen months. ...

The plaintiff allegedly was kept for three years beyond his sentence
expiration because he refused to sign an installment schedule agreement for
his unpaid fines.

The wardens of prisons in Virginia and West Virginia were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in D.C. on a Bivens claim, since the plaintiff was
never imprisoned there, the wardens weren't located there, and they
committed no acts there.

The District of Columbia was not the proper venue where all the relevant
events took place in Virginia, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. The
convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice supported
transfer to the Northern District of West Virginia. See: Zakiya v. United
States, 267 F.Supp.2d 47 (D.D.C. 2003).

Alonzo Echols, 48, is not Alonzo Eacholes, despite repeatedly telling
officers, jails, and courts this. In February of 2000, Echols was arrested
for felony battery on a warrant that should have been for Eacholes. His
release took 18 months, though Echols' attorney knew immediately of the
mistake. Echols sued Wyandotte ...